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September 15, 2005 
 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 
 
My name is Jay Thomas. I currently serve on the law faculty of the Georgetown 
University. I am honored to have the opportunity to testify at this hearing in my 
individual capacity, as a concerned observer of the patent system. 
 
This subcommittee deserves congratulations for its perseverance in its efforts to reform 
the legal regime that is widely regarded as America's engine of innovation. Many of the 
provisions of H.R. 2795 have been the subject of serious discussion since the publication 
of the Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System-which was issued in 
1966 at the request of the Johnson administration. Your leadership in advancing these 
reforms has been remarkable, and we remain confident that you will achieve a bill that 
will balance the interests of patent owners, innovative industry, and the public alike.  
 
Apportionment of Damages 
 
Pending legislation would address the award of damages where the patented invention 
forms but one component of the infringer's larger commercial product or process. Section 
6 of both the July 26, 2005, substitute to H.R. 2795, as well as the proposal of September 
1st, are directed towards perceived concerns about overly generous damages awards in 
this context. Generally speaking, they both call for the apportionment of infringement 
damages in a manner that takes into account the infringer's own contributions. The 
proposed language derives in part from the seminal 1970 opinion of the federal district 
court in Georgia- Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., which has in turn been 
frequently relied upon by the Federal Circuit. 
 
Given that this general concept of apportionment has been part of the patent law for at 
least 35 years, one might wonder about the controversy this portion of the bill has 
engendered. The rationale for this provision appears to be concerns over the potential for 
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overly generous awards of damages based upon so- called system claims. Allow me to 
provide a simple, and somewhat exaggerated example illustrating this concern. The 
inventors of an improved rear view mirror may draft a claim that sets out the various 
components of their mirror. But they may also draft a claim towards an automobile that 
incorporates that rear view mirror. Under established law, if an automobile manufacturer 
infringes the rear view mirror patent, an award of damages based upon the purchase price 
of the entire automobile is inappropriate. The precise damages determination, however, is 
one that is necessarily subject to case-bycase consideration. 
 
With apportionment already a settled part of the patent law, and indeed an established 
part of allied disciplines such as the copyright law as well,4 a codification of this 
principle does not likely qualify as a centerpiece of this legislation. One option that the 
subcommittee may believe to be most appropriate is simply not to speak to this issue 
within this legislative package. 
 
Should this subcommittee believe that legislative reform is appropriate, allow me to make 
a few observations concerning Section 6 of the July 26, 2005, substitute to H.R. 2795. 
That provision in part requires a court to assess "the portion of the realizable value that 
should be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished from" other factors. The 
required assessment of the "inventive contribution" of a patented combination-rather than 
an analysis founded upon the words of the claims themselves-would arguably mark a 
notable change in U.S. patent law. As the Federal Circuit recently stated: It is well settled 
that "there is no legally recognizable or protected 'essential' element, gist or 'heart' of the 
invention in a combination patent." Rather, "'[t]he invention' is defined by the claims." 
 
The subcommittee may wish to consider whether apportionment, which is a discrete 
problem arising in a limited set of cases, merits what might constitute a substantial 
change to the patent law. Notably, the September 1st proposal eliminates the bill's 
reference to an "inventive contribution." The July 26, 2005, substitute to H.R. 2795 also 
refers to "combination patents." The subcommittee should be aware that this phrase is a 
term of art in the patent law. Older case law in essence used this term as a pejorative, to 
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suggest that such a patent claimed an invention that was merely a collection of parts that 
have been cobbled together, and was thus of dubious validity. As the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit has more recently explained: 
 
Virtually all patents are "combination patents," if by that label one intends to describe 
patents having claims to inventions formed of a combination of elements. It is difficult to 
visualize, at least in the mechanical-structural arts, a "non- combination" invention, i.e., 
an invention consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they exist, are rare indeed. 
The subcommittee may wish to recognize the history behind the term "combination 
patent" in deciding whether to employ in within the context of this legislative reform 
package. 
 
Finally, both the language of the July 26, 2005, substitute to H.R. 2795, as well as the 
proposal of September 1st, expressly apply only to an award of a reasonable royalty. 
Notably, the courts may also award damages, in appropriate cases, equal to the lost 
profits of the patent proprietor. Under the Patent Act, the reasonable royalties 
methodology is effectively the minimum compensation base.8 The reason both proposals 
are limited to reasonable royalties probably stems from the fact that they derive from the 
Georgia-Pacific case, which under its facts was itself limited to reasonable royalties. The 
policy grounding for a statutory apportionment provision applying only to reasonable 
royalties is unclear, however. The subcommittee may wish to consider whether the 
apportionment rule should apply to both damages methodologies applicable under the 
patent laws. 
 
Transfers of Venue 
 
New to the more recent versions of H.R. 2795 are provisions directed towards venue in 
patent litigation. For policy reasons that remain obscure, Congress has enacted a 
specialized venue statute for patent cases. Since the 1990 decision of the Federal Circuit 
in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., this statute has been construed in a 
liberal fashion. For corporate defendants, at least, venue is effectively conterminous with 
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personal jurisdiction.10 The result is a great deal of flexibility, to say the least, for patent 
plaintiffs in selecting a forum for litigation. 
 
Apparently animated by concerns over forum shopping, Section 9 of H.R. 2795 would 
provide more restrictive venue provisions. The September 1st proposal would instead 
stipulate standards for transfer of venue to a more appropriate forum. 
 
A few observations about these competing approaches, each of which has its merits, may 
be appropriate. First, the existence of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit limits 
the impact of forum shopping in patent cases. Forum shopping does not involve the 
search for the more favorable of alternative interpretations of the patent law, but rather 
different levels of judicial expertise, as well as distinct docket management systems that 
imply a different pace of litigation. As a result, the impact of forum shopping is 
diminished in comparison to many other fields of law. 
 
Flexibility in forum selection may well have contributed to the concentration of patent 
litigation in a handful of districts. This trend has allowed "thought leaders" to develop 
among members of the federal bench-distinguished jurists who have heard more than 
their share of patent cases. In addition to providing experienced fora for the resolution of 
patent disputes, these trial jurists enrich our bar and provide perspectives that might 
otherwise be lacking in law and policy debates. The potential impact of any proposed 
legislation upon this development should be considered. 
 
Finally, one of the major themes of H.R. 2795 is the desire to decrease the costs and 
complexities of patent litigation. Deletion of the best mode requirement, and limitations 
upon the doctrines of inequitable conduct and willful infringement, are among those 
provisions that would lend more focus to patent trials. The September 1st proposal, which 
provides standards for transfer of venue, is arguably not in keeping with the remainder of 
the bill, which generally limits resource-intensive satellite determinations in patent cases. 
This subcommittee may wish to get to the bottom of the nature of venue in patent cases, 
rather than potentially add an additional wrinkle to patent enforcement proceedings. 
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The Grace Period 
 
Since 1839, the U.S. patent law has allowed for a one-year grace period. However, 
because the one-year date is based upon the actual U.S. filing date,11 that provision has 
been something of an illusion to foreign applicants. This means that applicants who rely 
upon grace periods in their home jurisdictions, and then take advantage of the full period 
of international priority, imperil their U.S. rights. Recently, U.S. trade negotiators have 
arguably aggravated this situation. For example, in the free trade agreement negotiated 
between the United States and Australia, each signatory agreed to provide a one-year 
grace period based upon the applicant's own disclosures.12 Perhaps not mentioned during 
the negotiation was that should an Australian inventor take advantage of the grace period 
in his own jurisdiction, he would almost certainly forfeit any U.S. rights that he might be 
able to obtain. Legal harmonization-through the incentives contemplated by the proposed 
legislation-is an important goal. Nonetheless the United States could opt to lead by 
example, and provide a grace period based upon the effective, rather than the actual U.S. 
filing date. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Let me close by offering a few observations about H.R. 2795. Although the FTC and 
National Academies Reports may have served as the foundations for this legislation, it 
should be noted that (1) many of the recommendations do not form part of H.R. 2795; 
and (2) that many of the provisions of H.R. 2795 find no analog in those reports. The 
subcommittee may wish to acknowledge these distinctions in its report accompanying 
this legislation, and explain why many of the significant recommendations within these 
reports did not see the light of day. 
 
Second, two of the original provisions of H.R. 2795, relating to injunctions and 
continuation applications, are apparently no longer part of the legislative reform package. 
While they may be gone, they will not be forgotten. On September 9, 2005, the Federal 
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Circuit decided Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research 
Foundation L.L.P.,13 affirming the judgment that a patent was invalid for prosecution 
laches. Presently before the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari is eBay, Inc. v. 
Mercexchange L.L.C.,14 which questions the Federal Circuit's general rule that 
victorious patentees should be entitled to injunctions in infringement cases. So I wish 
merely to warn the subcommittee that these issues may potentially darken your door in 
the near future, and that the patent community may require the benefit of your wise 
judgments in future reform efforts. 
 
Again, my thanks to the subcommittee for allowing me to testify before you. 
